1. Factual Background and Procedural History
The case arose from disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa (BCMG) against Advocate Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula, under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, alleging professional misconduct.
The complaint was filed by Khimji Devji Parmar, claiming to be the legal heir of one Devji Parmar, a partner in M/s. Volga Enterprises. The firm had engaged in a development agreement concerning land in Malad, Mumbai, originally owned by Nusli Randelia. Subsequent litigation ensued between M/s. Unique Construction and Randelia, which culminated in Consent Terms recorded before the Bombay High Court.
Parmar alleged that the consent decree had been fraudulently obtained without the knowledge of one of the partners, Dara Nariman Sarkari, and accused the respondent-advocate of suppressing material facts and participating in the fraud.
The BCMG, upon receiving the complaint, passed a brief order dated 6 July 2023, stating that a “prima facie case” existed and referred the matter to its Disciplinary Committee. The Bombay High Court, however, stayed the proceedings, finding the reference order unsatisfactory. The Bar Council then approached the Supreme Court of India via SLP (Civil) No. 27606 of 2023, assailing the High Court’s interim order.
Alongside, connected matters (SLP (Civil) No. 1492 of 2024 and Diary No. 38238 of 2023) were heard together, as they involved identical legal issues concerning disciplinary references under Section 35 of the Advocates Act.
The judgment was rendered by a Division Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta on 24 September 2025.
2. Identification of Legal Issues
The Supreme Court addressed the following pivotal legal questions:
- Whether the State Bar Council must record a reasoned satisfaction of a prima facie case before referring a complaint to its Disciplinary Committee under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
- Whether the mere identification of a party or attestation by an advocate amounts to professional misconduct.
- Whether a complaint filed by a person who was not the advocate’s client is maintainable before a Bar Council.
- Whether the High Court was justified in entertaining a writ petition against an interlocutory order of reference by the Bar Council.
3. Arguments of the Parties
Appellant – Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa
Counsel for the BCMG argued that:
- The High Court’s interference with a preliminary order of cognizance was premature.
- At the stage of referral, the Bar Council need not provide detailed reasons; a brief finding of prima facie satisfaction would suffice under Section 35.
- The advocate had the remedy of appeal before the Bar Council of India, and therefore, the writ petition before the High Court was not maintainable.
Respondent – Advocate Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula
Counsel for the respondent contended that:
- The complaint was malicious, frivolous, and devoid of any factual or legal foundation.
- The respondent never represented the complainant or his predecessors; his role was limited to identifying the plaintiff’s authorized representative in the consent terms, which still stand valid.
- There existed no professional relationship between the complainant and the respondent, making the complaint unsustainable under Section 35.
- The referral order was cryptic and non-speaking, lacking any reference to the allegations or reasoning to establish a prima facie case of misconduct.
- The High Court rightly intervened to prevent abuse of process and reputational harm to a practising advocate.
4. Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
a) Requirement of Prima Facie Satisfaction under Section 35
The Court emphasized that Section 35(1) mandates that a State Bar Council must record reasons to believe that an advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct before referring the case to its Disciplinary Committee.
A reasoned satisfaction based on material facts is a sine qua non for invoking disciplinary jurisdiction.
The Court drew heavily from its earlier precedent in Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat, (1980 Supp SCC 318), where it was held that:
“The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of the professional code of conduct and must apply its mind before initiating disciplinary action. The referral of a complaint must be founded upon a reasoned belief of misconduct.”
The Supreme Court reiterated that the Bar Council is not a mere post office forwarding complaints mechanically; it must exercise independent judgment in safeguarding both the purity of the profession and the rights of advocates.
b) Absence of Professional Relationship
The Bench clarified that disciplinary jurisdiction under Section 35 generally presupposes the existence of a jural relationship between the complainant and the advocate.
In this case, since the respondent-advocate never represented the complainant or his predecessor, and merely identified a party in the consent terms, there was no foundation for alleging misconduct.
c) Non-application of Mind by the Bar Council
The referral order dated 6 July 2023 was described as “absolutely cryptic and laconic”, lacking even a cursory mention of the allegations or reasoning. The Court observed that such mechanical references can tarnish the professional reputation of advocates and violate statutory safeguards.
The Supreme Court thus held that the Bar Council’s failure to record reasons vitiated the proceedings, rendering them ultra vires Section 35(1).
d) Frivolous and Malicious Prosecution
The Court found the complaint to be wholly frivolous, observing that the consent terms recorded by the High Court remain undisturbed, and hence, no cause of action could arise against the advocate.
It termed the proceedings an instance of malicious prosecution, warning that disciplinary mechanisms must not be weaponized to harass members of the Bar.
e) Policy and Institutional Integrity
The Bench underscored that while the Bar Council’s role as the guardian of professional ethics is paramount, its disciplinary powers must be tempered by procedural fairness and judicious reasoning.
The Court reaffirmed that unreasoned referrals erode public confidence in regulatory bodies and jeopardize the independence of the legal profession.
5. Final Conclusion and Holding
The Supreme Court:
- Quashed Disciplinary Case No. 27 of 2023 and all consequential proceedings against Advocate Rajiv Narula.
- Imposed costs of ₹50,000 on the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa for entertaining and pursuing a frivolous complaint.
- Directed that the costs be deposited with the Registry of the Bombay High Court for payment to the respondent-advocate.
- Extended similar findings in the connected case (Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri v. BCMG), reiterating that mere identification or attestation by an advocate does not constitute misconduct.
The Court’s pronouncement establishes a binding principle:
“A Bar Council must record a reasoned satisfaction of a prima facie case before referring an advocate to the disciplinary committee; cryptic or mechanical orders are invalid and constitute abuse of disciplinary powers.”
FAQs:
1. What is required for a Bar Council to refer a complaint against an advocate?
Before referring a complaint, the Bar Council must record written reasons showing a prima facie belief that the advocate committed professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act.
2. Can a complaint be filed against an advocate by someone who was not their client?
Ordinarily, disciplinary jurisdiction arises only where a professional relationship exists between the complainant and the advocate. Complaints from third parties are generally not maintainable unless public interest is directly involved.
3. Does merely identifying or attesting a document make an advocate liable for misconduct?
No. The Supreme Court clarified that simply identifying a party or attesting a document does not amount to endorsing its contents or committing professional misconduct.
4. What happens if the Bar Council issues a referral order without reasons?
An unreasoned or mechanical referral order violates Section 35 of the Advocates Act and is liable to be quashed as an instance of non-application of mind.
5. Can the High Court interfere with Bar Council disciplinary proceedings?
Yes, where the Bar Council’s order is found to be arbitrary, cryptic, or beyond statutory powers, the High Court can intervene under Article 226 to prevent abuse of process and protect the advocate’s professional reputation.
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